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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Rana Lynn Klingner appeals from the judgement of the district court entered upon the
jury verdict finding her guilty of Grand Theft for stealing from Boise County.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2013 and for most of 2014 Klingner was the deputy auditor for Boise County and
worked in the county clerk’s office. (2/14/17 Tr., p. 86, L. 6 – p. 87, L. 14. 1) Boise County has a
number of different departments. (2/14/17 Tr., p. 69, L. 12 – p. 74, L. 22.) These departments
include Waste Management, Indigent Services, and the District Court. (See Exs. 6-16, 18-24.)
When a department receives funds from the citizens, that department prepares a transmittal sheet.
(2/14/17 Tr., p. 69, L. 12 – p. 74, L. 22.) The transmittal sheet is signed by two individuals in
that department. (Id.) That signed transmittal sheet, along with the funds, were then hand
delivered to Klingner. (Id.) Klingner would then sign the transmittal sheet indicating that she
received the amount of funds listed on the transmittal sheet. (Id.)
After receiving the transmittal and the funds, Klingner was then responsible for preparing
the Auditor’s Certificates, sometimes referred to as “ACs”. (2/14/17 Tr., p. 72, L. 9 – p. 76, L.
12.) An Auditor’s Certificate is the official documentation showing money coming into the
county’s financial accounting system. (Id.) The Auditor’s Certificate shows which department
received that money and which account that money is going to be put into. (Id.) After an
Auditor’s Certificate is prepared, a copy of the Auditor’s Certificate and the transmittal and the
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The trial transcript, February 13, 2017 to February 21, 2017 misspells Klingner as “Klinger.”
For ease of reference, Respondent’s brief will spell Appellant’s name correctly throughout, even
when citing or quoting the trial transcript.
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underlying funds are hand delivered over to the treasurer’s office. (2/14/17 Tr., p. 81, Ls. 3-9.)
The departments would also receive a copy of the Auditor’s Certificate in order to reconcile their
books. (See 2/15/17 Tr., p. 335, L. 2 – p. 340, L. 15.) Klingner was the only one trained to
receive the transmittals and produce the Auditor’s Certificate. (2/14/17 Tr., p. 75, L. 2 – p. 76, L.
12.)
However, in 2013 and 2014 some of the departments stopped receiving the Auditor’s
Certificates. (2/15/17 Tr., p. 335, L. 2 – p. 340, L. 15.) When she was contacted, Klingner
would say she was busy and she would get to them as soon as she could.

(Id.)

Some

departments would not receive Auditor’s Certificates for months. (Id.) Eventually the Auditor’s
Certificates just stopped coming. (Id.)
Citizens started calling the Boise County departments to complain that they had paid their
fines or fees, but their checks were not being cashed. (2/15/17 Tr., p. 287, L. 5 – p. 289, L. 11, p.
304, L. 15 – p. 305, L. 6; 2/16/17 Tr., p. 370, L. 8 – p. 371, L. 15.) It was an ongoing issue.
(2/15/17 Tr., p. 287, L. 5 – p. 289, L. 11.)
Gina Turner, the chief deputy treasurer conducted an investigation for the missing
Auditor’s Certificate’s and discovered the county was missing funds (2/16/17 Tr., p. 370, L. 8 –
p. 371, L. 15.) Funds were reaching Klingner’s desk, but not all of those funds were making it to
the Boise County treasurer’s office. (See 2/16/17 Tr., p. 377, L. 23 – p. 384, L. 23; Exs. 18-20.)
After funds were discovered missing, the police were contacted and an investigation followed.
(2/14/17 Tr., p. 89, L. 15 – p. 90, L. 13.)
Eventually, Detective Gooch, of the Idaho State Police, was brought in to investigate.
(2/16/17 Tr., p. 528, L. 15 – p. 529, L. 23.) During the investigation, the police interviewed a
number of people within Boise County government, including all of the employees of the Boise
2

County clerk’s office. (2/16/17 Tr., p.531, L. 2 – p.533, L. 6.) As part of the investigation,
Detective Gooch had every member of the clerk’s office perform a polygraph test. 2 (See 2/16/17
Tr., p. 584, L. 25 – p. 586, L. 14.)
Klingner initially agreed to take the polygraph test and was given the day off in order to
take it. (2/16/17 Tr., p. 585, Ls. 5-13.) However, on the day she was scheduled to take the test,
Klingner called her boss, Ms. Prisco, and told Ms. Prisco to tell Detective Gooch that she was too
busy to take the polygraph test. (Id.)
By comparing the amount of money listed on the transmittal sheets to the amount of
money the treasurer’s office received, the investigation was able to determine that the money
went missing after it was received by Klingner and before it reached the treasurer’s office. (See
2/16/17 Tr., p. 373, L. 12 – p. 384, L. 23, p. 437, L. 18 – p. 441, L. 22; Exs. 18-24.) After
Klingner was asked to leave her job, the clerk’s office staff found several checks, all related to
planning and zoning, still in Klingner’s desk. (2/14/17 Tr., p. 91, L. 8 – p. 92, L. 1; 2/15/17 Tr.,
p. 234, Ls. 4-17; 2/16/17 Tr., p. 384, L. 24 – p. 385, L. 17.) The checks totaled over $3,000.
(Id.) The checks dated back months before Klingner’s resignation. (Id.)
The state charged Klingner with two counts of Grand Theft. (R., pp. 54-56.) During a
pre-trial hearing regarding potential jury issues, the state brought up the fact that the investigators

2

The record in this appeal does not include the police reports or the preliminary hearing
transcripts or sworn testimony regarding portions of the investigation. Therefore most of the
information regarding the use of the polygraph during the investigation comes from the
representations of the attorneys during arguments. (See 2/16/17 Tr., p. 584, L. 25 – p. 586, L.
14.) Where pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support
the actions of the trial court. See State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416, 422, 913 P.2d 1186, 1192 (Ct.
App. 1996).
3

had used polygraphs during the investigation. (1/18/17 Tr., p. 19, L. 19 – p. 20, L. 11.) The
district court indicated its understanding that polygraph evidence is not admissible and advised
the parties it “would probably issue an in limine order that it’s not even to be discussed and
witnesses are to be cautioned not to even so much as bring it up,” but stated it would let the
parties file “appropriate motions” rather than issuing a ruling “off the cuff.” (1/18/17 Tr., p. 20,
Ls. 2-11.) The state explained that its primary concern was whether potential jurors knew of the
polygraphs and the district court then discussed whether potential jurors should be asked about
polygraphs and whether a change of venue would be appropriate. (See 1/18/17 Tr., p. 19, L. 19 –
p. 22, L. 3.) Venue was eventually changed to Ada County. (R., p. 102.)
At trial, Mary Prisco, a certified public accountant and the elected clerk for Boise County,
testified regarding the report issued by the outside auditing firm, Bailey and Company. (2/14/17
Tr., p. 52, Ls. 17-25, p. 69, Ls. 1-4; Ex. 5.) Ms. Prisco testified that the funds and transmittal
sheets were delivered to Klingner:
Q. And describe the procedure physically as to what was to take place
when the transmittal was delivered to the -- to Ms. Klingner.
A. So the transmittals and the monies were brought by the representative
of the department that initially collected them. And they were counted again in the
presence of that individual by the person accepting the monies, which was
typically Rana [Klingner] as our deputy auditor.
And then there’s a signature for that, basically, taking control of that
transmittal and those funds, there’s a signature on the transmittal from the clerk’s
office.
(2/14/17 Tr., p. 74, Ls. 11-22.) After the county determined there was a loss of funds, Ms. Prisco
reported the loss to ICRMP, the county’s insurance carrier. (2/14/17 Tr., p. 81, Ls. 11-22.) The
county reported a $47,922 loss. (Id.) ICRMP paid the claim, less the $1,000 deductible. (Id.)

4

Ms. Prisco also testified that, in June 2014, Melanie Elenes started doing the Auditor’s
Certificates. (2/15/17 Tr., p. 234, L. 18 – p. 236, L. 3.) The county’s loss of money ended at
around that time. (Id.) Ms. Prisco also testified that Klingner never voiced any concerns about
any Auditor’s Certificates or transmittals being missing. (2/15/17 Tr., p. 248, Ls. 14-19.)
Ms. Turner, the chief deputy treasurer for Boise County, testified that by comparing the
amount of the transmittals to the amount the treasurer’s office received, the investigation was
able to determine that money went missing after it was received by Klingner. (See 2/16/17 Tr., p.
373, L. 12 – p. 384, L. 23; Exs. 18-20.) Ms. Turner testified as to some months in which money
went missing. (Id.)
Sarita Loya, the deputy clerk in charge of elections and the indigent program, testified
that money went missing from the indigent program as well. (2/16/17 Tr., p. 426, L. 22 – p. 441,
L. 22; Exs. 21-24.) Ms. Loya conducted an investigation. (2/16/17 Tr., p. 441, L. 21 – p. 442, L.
24.) Ms. Loya went to the treasurer’s office, looked for check numbers, and she went through
her reports “line by line.” (Id.) She found that the payments were in her system, the indigent
program, but the payments were not in the Auditor’s Certificates or the treasurer’s office. (Id.)
Kari Allred, the administrative assistant with the Boise County solid waste and noxious
waste departments, testified that, in 2014, she became aware of discrepancies in the accounts.
(2/16/17 Tr., p. 467, L. 16 – p. 473, L. 18.) Ms. Allred was assigned to do an in-house audit.
(Id.) Paul Rekow and Ms. Allred found that, in 2013, there was a significant difference between
the amount of funds that were received by their employees and the amount of funds that were
deposited in the county’s account. (2/16/17 Tr., p. 508, Ls. 8-20.) Mr. Rekow and Ms. Allred
started seeing patterns in 2013 and 2014 where they would transmit funds to the clerk’s office
but those funds were not deposited into their account. (2/16/17 Tr., p. 509, L. 10 – p. 510, L. 18.)
5

Detective Gooch testified that she was brought in to investigate.. (2/16/17 Tr., p. 528, L.
15 – p. 529, L. 23.) Initially Detective Gooch looked at four Auditor’s Certificates in which
there were discrepancies with the transmittals. (See 2/16/17 Tr., p. 533, L. 10 – p. 534, L. 2.)
Detective Gooch was able to determine that all four of these Auditor’s Certificates were entered
into the system by Klingner. (2/16/17 Tr., p. 533, L. 10 – p. 535, L. 6.)
Detective Gooch interviewed Klingner. (2/16/17 Tr., p. 535, L. 7 – p. 540, L. 22.)
Klingner was unable to explain the discrepancies in the four Auditor’s Certificates. (Id.) At the
time of the interview Detective Gooch was unaware of other funds that were missing from Boise
County. (Id.) Klingner also denied any financial hardship. (Id.)
Detective Gooch expanded the scope of the investigation. (2/16/17 Tr., p. 540, L. 23 – p.
542, L. 4.) Detective Gooch received information from the deputy treasurer, that there was in
excess of $38,000 missing from six or seven departments in Boise County. (2/16/17 Tr., p. 540,
L. 23 – p. 542, L. 4.)
Detective Gooch got the supporting documentation related to the missing money,
including how the money came into the clerk’s office before it went to the treasurer’s office.
(2/16/17 Tr., p. 542, L. 20 – p. 544, L. 2.) She obtained the transmittal memos and cash balance
sheets. (Id.) All but two of the transmittal memos were signed by Klingner. (Id.)
Cross-examination centered on whether Detective Gooch focused on Klingner as soon as
she was assigned the case. (2/16/17 Tr., p. 555, L. 20 – p. 565, L. 21.) Klingner pressed
Detective Gooch on why she only got a search warrant for Klingner’s bank account, and how
Detective Gooch had eliminated other suspects. (2/16/17 Tr., p. 579, L. 13 – p. 580, L. 9.)
Q. You identified that you had put several search warrants together to
look at the bank account information of Ms. Klingner for potential
deposits, I assume?
6

A. Yes, of missing monies, yes.
Q. And the State has already agreed that those deposits did not go into
Ms. Klingner’s account. Did you look at anyone else’s bank accounts?
A. No, because we utilized investigative techniques to eliminate the need
to.
Q. One more time. Can you repeat that?
A. We employed a tool available to us to look at other potential suspects,
and we were able to eliminate those people through that tool.
Q. How did that take place?
A. It’s in the form of polygraphs.
Q. In 2015, the additional $1,700 goes missing, correct?
A. Last year. I thought it was last year. Can I look at –
Q. Yeah, please.
A. No, I don’t have those reports because it’s a separate investigation.
(2/16/17 Tr., p. 579, L. 13 – p. 580, L. 9.) Klingner continued to question Detective Gooch about
money that had gone missing from Boise County after Klingner was charged. (2/16/17 Tr., p.
580, L. 3 – p. 583, L. 5.) Klingner then cross-examined Detective Gooch about whether she
thought someone other than Klingner could have stolen the money from Boise County and
attempted to impeach her with her preliminary hearing testimony. (See 2/16/17 Tr., p. 583, L. 7
– p. 584, L. 13.)
After cross-examination, the state then asked to take up a matter outside the presence of
the jury. (2/16/17 Tr., p. 584, Ls. 16-20.) The state explained it was surprised that Klingner had
opened the door regarding the polygraph tests and asked that it be allowed to explore the issue
with the witness. (See 2/16/17 Tr., p. 584, L. 25 – p. 586, L. 14 (“I, frankly, had not anticipated
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[defense counsel] opening that issue up.”).)

The state asked the court to end the day early,

because addressing the polygraph issue was not something the state anticipated; it was “a total
surprise to the State.” (2/16/17 Tr., p. 586, Ls. 10-14.) Klingner then moved for a mistrial
because she was concerned the jury would think Klingner failed a polygraph test. (2/16/17 Tr., p.
586, L. 18 – p. 587, L. 12.) The district court took the matters under advisement. (See 2/16/17
Tr., p. 587, L. 13 – p. 588, L. 3.) The district court asked for briefing from the parties. (2/16/17
Tr., p. 589, Ls. 7-20; R., pp. 147-156.)
After additional research the district court denied the motion for a mistrial. (2/17/17 Tr.,
p. 618, L. 6 – p. 624, L. 17.) The district court went through the line of questioning that elicited
the reference to the polygraph and found that Klingner’s questioning constituted invited error
because the defense was focusing on the investigative techniques and whether there was anyone
else who was responsible for the thefts. (Id.) However, the district court decided to give a
curative instruction. (Id.)
So -- and I again may be repeating myself, but I can’t find that the
evidence is such that this jury is going to go back there and have wonderment
about polygraphs and who took them, who didn’t, who passed, who failed.
I think that the evidence is such that they used some investigative
techniques and that -- instructing the jury that polygraphs are not accepted, not to
be considered by them I think is sufficient to allow the trial to continue to go forth
and that Ms. Klingner is not in a situation where because of this evidence she’s
being denied the opportunity to have a fair and impartial jury decide this case.
So that’s the Court’s ruling in that regard.
(2/17/17 Tr., p. 620, L. 25 – p. 624, L. 17.) The curative instruction, Instruction 8(A), instructed
the jury that polygraphs are not accepted in the scientific community as reliable.
Testimony was presented in court regarding the use of polygraph
examinations utilized as an investigative tool by law enforcement to assist them in
the investigation of this case.

8

Polygraphs are not accepted in the scientific community as a reliable
method of ascertaining the truth and you are not to consider whether or not a
polygraph was given or speculate as to what any results might have been.
(R., p. 188.) The district court gave the jury instruction 8(A). (2/17/17 Tr., p. 632, L. 21 – p.
633, L. 12.)
The district court then told the jury that Klingner’s father passed away and she had to
attend his funeral at the Veteran’s Administration, and then adjourned the trial for the day.
(2/17/17 Tr., p. 633, L. 13 – p. 635, L. 8.)
The next court day, the state argued that Instruction 8(A) would cause the jury to
disregard Detective Gooch’s testimony and moved for additional jury instructions explaining that
polygraphs can be used during investigations. (2/21/17 Tr., p. 637, L. 13 – p. 651, L. 21.) The
state was concerned that Instruction 8(A) was so favorable to the defense that the state may not
get a fair trial and indicated that, if the district court did not give additional instructions, the state
would move for a mistrial.

(Id.) The district court took the motion for a mistrial under

advisement to see how the trial would go and denied the state’s motion for additional jury
instructions.

(2/21/17 Tr., p. 651, L. 21 – p. 655, L. 12.) Klingner objected to additional

testimony regarding investigative techniques or tools, the district court overruled the objection
and clarified that the state would be permitted, on redirect, to have Detective Gooch testify
regarding the investigative techniques she used in this case. (2/21/17 Tr., p. 655, L. 15 – p. 657,
L. 14.)
On re-direct Detective Gooch testified, in general terms, that she used various
investigative tools and methods during her investigation of this case. (2/21/17 Tr., p. 658, L. 20
– p. 671, L. 16.) Detective Gooch explained that, based upon interviews, she focused her
investigation on Klingner. (2/21/17 Tr., p. 661, L. 9 – p. 662, L. 13.) Detective Gooch focused
9

her investigation on the clerk’s office because that’s where the money disappeared from.
(2/21/17 Tr., p. 664, L. 19 – p. 666, L. 20.) Klingner declined to re-cross Detective Gooch.
(2/21/17 Tr., p. 671, Ls. 17-21.)
After Detective Gooch finished testifying, Klingner renewed her motion for a mistrial.
(2/21/17 Tr., p. 673, L. 6 – p. 675, L. 8.) The district court denied the motion finding there had
not been unfair prejudice to the defendant. (Id.) The district court explained that the testimony
of Detective Gooch covered “a lot of techniques that are used in an investigation” that are not
done with a polygraph. (Id.) While the district court denied the motion at that time, the district
court kept the motion under advisement. (Id.)
Linda Czemerys, a financial investigator, testified that she examined Klingner’s Wells
Fargo bank account. (2/21/17 Tr., p. 677, L. 6 – p. 688, L. 25; Exs. 26-33.) Klingner utilized
direct deposit advances, also called Pay Day loans. (2/21/17 Tr., p. 680, L. 21 – p. 688, L. 25;
Exs. 26-31.) In 2013 Klingner took $16,860 in advances, and between January and mid-April
2014, Klingner took $5,700 in advances. (Id.) Each advance had a fee associated with it. (Id.)
In 2013 the fees totaled $1,287.50, and from January to mid-April 2014, the fees totaled $427.50.
(Id.) In 2013 Wells Fargo also charged Klingner $1,610 in overdraft fees. (Id.) From January to
mid-April 2014, Klingner incurred $2,205 in overdraft fees. (Id.) Klingner was living “paycheck
to paycheck” and was “going into a negative situation.” (Id.) The negative bank balances even
continued after Klingner’s husband got a job working in an oil field in the Dakotas. (Id.) After
the state presented all of its witnesses, the defense rested and presented no testimony. (2/21/17
Tr., p. 709, Ls. 7-11.) The jury found Klingner guilty of both Grand Theft counts. (R., p. 208.)

10

After trial, Klingner renewed her motion for a mistrial. (R., pp. 209-210, 218-238.) The
district court held a hearing on the post-trial motions and on the issue of restitution. The state
withdrew its motion for a mistrial. (3/22/17 Tr., p. 32, L. 8 – p. 79, L. 21.)
At the restitution hearing the state submitted the affidavit of Mary Prisco and a detailed
spreadsheet showing the county’s losses. (3/22/17 Tr., p. 9, L. 3 – p. 32, L. 9; Ex. 1; R., pp. 240244.) The spreadsheet was admitted into evidence.

(Id.) The state utilized the evidence

introduced at trial regarding the money missing from the departments. (Id.)
The district court entered a written decision. (R., pp. 284-303.) The district court denied
the motion for a mistrial and ordered restitution in the amount of $36,376.37. (R., pp. 301-302,
304.) The district court found that Klingner invited the testimony regarding the polygraph and
thus it was not a basis for a mistrial. (R., pp. 290-298.) The district court further analyzed the
standard for a mistrial and determined that there was not a basis for a mistrial, especially
considering the curative instruction and the strength of the evidence against Klingner. (See id.)
Prior to sentencing, the state moved to consolidate counts I and II into a single conviction
for the purposes of sentencing. (R., pp. 259-261.) The district court ordered to two counts
consolidated. (R., pp. 282-283.) The district court entered judgment on Grand Theft and
sentenced Klingner to five years with two years fixed. (R., pp. 308-315.) The district court
suspended the sentence and placed Klingner on probation for five years. (Id.) Klingner timely
appealed. (R., pp. 316-322.)
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ISSUES
Klingner does not separately articulate the issues on appeal, however Klingner does
provide headings which appear to generally state the issues on appeal, and they will be quoted
here.
1.

The District Court Committed Reversible Error By Denying The Party’s
Joint Motion For a Mistrial.

2.

By Permitting The Admission Of Additional Polygraph Evidence And
Denying The Appellant’s Motion For Mistrial, [The] District Court
Committed Reversible Error.

3.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering Restitution In The
Amount Of $36,376.37.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 1.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Klingner failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it denied
her motion for a mistrial?
2.
Has Klingner failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it
overruled her objection and permitted Detective Gooch to testify on re-direct regarding the
investigative techniques she used during the investigation?
3.
Has Klingner failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it
awarded restitution based upon the evidence admitted at trial and at the restitution hearing?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Klingner’s Motion For a Mistrial
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Klingner’s motion for a mistrial. (See R., pp. 288-298.) The

district court found that Klingner invited the error because Klingner knew that polygraphs were
used as investigative techniques during the investigation, yet Klingner repeatedly questioned
Detective Gooch about it. (See id.) The district court also found, in light of the curative
instruction and with the strong evidence of Klingner’s guilt, that the reference to a polygraph was
not significant and not grounds for a mistrial. (See id.)
On appeal, Klingner argues her questioning of Detective Gooch was not invited error
because she claims Detective Gooch did not give accurate answers. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.
24-32.)

She also argues that the admission of the reference to the polygraph on cross-

examination and the subsequent re-direct of Detective Gooch also provide a basis for a mistrial.
(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 20-44.) Klingner’s arguments are not supported by the record or the
law. Klingner has failed to show the district court erred when it found invited error, or when it
found that Klingner was not entitled to a mistrial.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review applicable to the refusal of a trial court to grant a mistrial upon a

motion in a criminal case is well established:
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably
exercised his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial
motion was made. Rather, the question must be whether the event which
precipitated the motion for mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in
the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied
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in a criminal case, the ‘abuse of discretion’ standard is a misnomer. The standard,
more accurately stated, is one of reversible error. [The appellate court’s] focus is
upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that triggered the mistrial
motion. The trial judge’s refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that
incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error.
State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 498, 198 P.3d 128, 136 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting State v.
Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95, 665 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Ct. App. 1983)). Because the right to due
process guarantees only a fair trial, not an error-free one, “error is not reversible unless it is
shown to be prejudicial.” Grantham, 146 Idaho at 498, 198 P.3d at 136 (citing State v. Shepherd,
124 Idaho 54, 57, 855 P.2d 891, 894 (Ct. App. 1993)). “Error will be deemed harmless if the
appellate court is able to declare, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable
possibility that the evidence complained of contributed to the conviction.” Shepherd, 124 Idaho
at 58, 855 P.2d at 895 (citations omitted).

C.

Klingner Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Denied Her Motion For
A Mistrial
Klingner argues the district court erred when it denied her motion for a mistrial. (See

Appellant’s brief, pp. 20-44.) Klingner’s brief first addresses the record before the re-direct of
Detective Gooch in Section I and the record after the re-direct of Detective Gooch in Section II.
(See id.) However, when reviewing a denial of a motion for mistrial, the appellate court reviews
the event that precipitated the motion for the mistrial in the context of the full record. See
Grantham, 146 Idaho at 498, 198 P.3d at 136. Therefore, since the denial of the motion for
mistrial must be viewed in context of the full record, the state will address the entirety of mistrial
issue in Section I of this brief. Klingner also included an evidentiary issue regarding the re-direct
of Detective Gooch in Section II of her brief.

(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 40-44.)

evidentiary issue will be addressed in Section II of Respondent’s brief.
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This

“A mistrial may be declared, upon the defendant’s motion, if there has been an error or
legal defect during the trial which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a
fair trial.” State v. Dopp, 129 Idaho 597, 603, 930 P.2d 1039, 1045 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing
I.C.R. 29.1); accord, e.g., State v. Ruiz, 159 Idaho 722, 724, 366 P.3d 644, 646 (Ct. App. 2015).
“The admission of improper evidence does not automatically require the declaration of a
mistrial.” Ruiz, 159 Idaho at 724, 366 P.3d at 646 (citing State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 631, 97
P.3d 1014, 1020 (Ct. App. 2004)). Rather, “[t]he core inquiry” when denial of a mistrial is
challenged on appeal is “whether it appears from the record that the event triggering the mistrial
motion contributed to the verdict, leaving the appellate court with a reasonable doubt that the
jury would have reached the same result had the event not occurred.” State v. Palin, 106 Idaho
70, 75, 675 P.2d 49, 54 (Ct. App. 1983).

In conducting this inquiry, the appellate court

“normally presume[s] that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence.”
State v. Watkins, 152 Idaho 764, 768, 274 P.3d 1279, 1283 (Ct. App. 2012). To overcome the
presumption, a defendant claiming error in the denial of a mistrial motion must show “there is an
overwhelming probability that the jury [was] unable to follow the court’s instructions and a
strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence [was] devastating to the defendant.” Ruiz, 159
Idaho at 724-25, 366 P.3d at 646-47 (citation omitted). Where, as here, a defendant claims a
curative instruction was insufficient to remedy the prejudicial effect of inadmissible evidence, the
appellate court’s analysis focuses not only on the curative instruction, but also on the “strength of
the evidence” and “the significance of the improperly disclosed information.” Watkins, 152
Idaho at 768, 274 P.3d at 1283; Ruiz, 159 Idaho at 725, 366 P.3d at 647.
Application of these standards to the facts of this case shows the district court correctly
denied Klingner’s motion for a mistrial.
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1.

There Was Never A “Joint Motion” For A Mistrial

Klingner claims there was a “joint motion” by both the defense and the state for a
mistrial. (See Appellant’s brief, p. 20.) While both parties did make motions, the basis of those
motions were different.

Klingner cites only to a portion of the state’s argument.

(See

Appellant’s brief, p. 22 (citing 2/21/17 Tr., p. 644, Ls. 3-7).) However, when the state’s full
argument is examined it is clear the state was not joining in the basis for Klingner’s mistrial
motion. (See 2/21/17 Tr., p. 637, L. 14 – p. 646, L. 14.) The state made a conditional motion on
the basis that Instruction 8(A) was prejudicial to the state. (Id.)
After the district court gave Instruction 8(A), the state argued that 8(A) “will cause the
jury to disregard a great deal of Detective Gooch’s testimony.” (Id.) The state then argued that
polygraphs are acceptable to use during an investigation and requested the district court give
additional instructions to that effect. (Id.) Klingner objected to the additional instructions. (Id.)
The state went on to explain that, because of Klingner’s invited error, the state was in a difficult
situation and the district court should apply some sort of corrective measure, and absent that
corrective measure the state would move for a mistrial:
[PROSECUTOR]: In light of my understanding -Well, I think you can cure it, Your Honor, with giving one of those
instructions. Absent one of those instructions, I think both sides, you know,
[defense counsel] already moved for a mistrial. We opposed that not knowing
exactly what the Court would and how they would do it.
But I think we would join in that because I truly, after thinking about it,
after reviewing my notes on your ruling of Friday, I clearly think we are in a
situation where we have no idea what the jury will or will not rely on
notwithstanding the instructions.
Though I have strong feelings about Ms. Klingner’s involvement in this
case, I also have incredibly strong feelings that she is entitled to a fair trial and a
fair jury.
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I am also concerned with the potential of post conviction depending on
what happens and issues on post conviction concerning counsel’s decision.
And I just think we’re in a horribly difficult situation, especially in the way
that the question was asked in light of what counsel, I believe, knew the answer
was going to be; the lack of an objection; the going on to a number of other
questions until his cross-examination was over; and then my asking to recess the
jury and trying to figure out what was going to happen thereafter.
I think we’re in an impossible situation.
THE COURT: All right.
So, again, sometimes the Judge is a little slow on the uptake, but you’re
saying based upon the totality of circumstances as we sit right now, it would be
the State’s position that you’re moving for a mistrial as well?
[PROSECUTOR]: Absent the corrective, whatever you want to call that
instruction, yes, Your Honor, definitely.
(2/21/17 Tr., p.645, L. 3 – 646, L. 14.) The state later withdrew its motion for a mistrial.
(3/22/17 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 7-16).
The state’s motion was based upon the curative instruction, Instruction 8(A), and the fact
that the curative instruction was only necessary because of Klingner’s invited error. Regardless,
the state eventually withdrew that motion, and the district court did not err when it denied
Klingner’s motion for a mistrial because Klingner invited the error.

2.

The District Court Correctly Found The Basis For Klingner’s Motion For A
Mistrial Was Caused By Her Invited Error

The district court denied Klingner’s motion for a mistrial in part because Klingner invited
the error on which her motion was based. (See 2/17/17 Tr., p. 618, L. 6 – p. 624, L. 20; R., pp.
293-294.) Klingner’s motion for a mistrial is based upon the answer Detective Gooch gave on
cross examination that referenced a polygraph. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 20-44.) Klingner also
cites to Detective Gooch’s testimony on re-direct; however the only reason she claims the redirect testimony is error is because she claims this testimony relates back to the polygraph
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reference. (See id.) On appeal, Klingner argues that the reference to a polygraph on crossexamination was not invited error because she claims Detective Gooch’s answers were not fair or
accurate. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 24-32.) Klingner’s arguments are not supported by the
record or the applicable law.
“Idaho courts have long held that ‘one may not successfully complain of errors one has
consented to or acquiesced in. In other words, invited errors are not reversible.’” State v.
Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing State v. Caudill, 109
Idaho 222, 226, 706 P.2d 456, 460 (1985); State v. Owsley, 105 Idaho 836, 673 P.2d 436
(1983)). “The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error when his
own conduct induces the commission of the error.” Id. (citing People v. Perez, 591 P.2d 63, 66,
n. 3 (Cal. 1979)).
During cross-examination Klingner pressed Detective Gooch on why she only got a
search warrant for Klingner’s bank account, and why Detective Gooch had not searched anyone
else’s bank account. (2/16/17 Tr., p. 579, L. 13 – p. 580, L. 9.)
Q. You identified that you had put several search warrants together to
look at the bank account information of Ms. Klingner for potential
deposits, I assume?
A. Yes, of missing monies, yes.
Q. And the State has already agreed that those deposits did not go into
Ms. Klingner’s account. Did you look at anyone else’s bank accounts?
A. No, because we utilized investigative techniques to eliminate the need
to.
Q. One more time. Can you repeat that?
A. We employed a tool available to us to look at other potential suspects,
and we were able to eliminate those people through that tool.
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Q. How did that take place?
A. It’s in the form of polygraphs.
Q. In 2015, the additional $1,700 goes missing, correct?
A. Last year. I thought it was last year. Can I look at –
Q. Yeah, please.
A. No, I don’t have those reports because it’s a separate investigation.
(2/16/17 Tr., p. 579, L. 13 – p. 580, L. 9.) This is the only time when Detective Gooch used the
word “polygraph.” (See id.)
Klingner continued to question Detective Gooch about money that had gone missing from
Boise County after Klingner was charged in this case, implying the investigative techniques used
to eliminate suspects did not work. (2/16/17 Tr., p. 580, L. 3 – p. 583, L. 5.) Klingner then
cross-examined Detective Gooch about whether she thought someone other than Klingner could
have stolen the money from Boise County. (See 2/16/17 Tr., p. 583, L. 7 – p. 584, L. 13.)
Klingner’s cross-examination was an attack on the effectiveness of Detective Gooch’s
investigative process, which she knew included the polygraphs.
The district court correctly applied the invited error precedent. (R., pp. 293-294 (citing
State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 864 P.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1993).) In Atkinson, a witness for the
state was instructed not to bring up the fact that an individual named Sam had been thrown from
the train. Atkinson, 124 Idaho at 820-821, 864 P.2d at 658-659. On cross-examination defense
counsel asked the witness when he pushed Atkinson in the chest:
Q. Well, for your benefit, there was some testimony from Mr. Hastings
that at some point you went up and pushed [Atkinson] in the chest. Do you recall
that?
A. No, sir.
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Q. Okay. So he would be mistaken?
A. Yes, sir. I didn’t—at this time I did not do that.
Q. Did you at any time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When?
A. After he threw Sam off.
Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals found the witness’ reference to Sam being thrown off the train
was invited error. Id.
The district court analyzed Atkinson and found it controlling. (See R., pp. 293-294.) The
district court found that Klingner knew that the polygraph examinations were used as an
investigative tool, but still repeatedly questioned Detective Gooch about the investigative tools
that she used. (R., p. 294.)
The circumstances here are very similar to those that occurred in Atkinson.
Counsel for the State said during the trial, outside of the presence of the jury, that
he informed Detective Gooch not to say anything about polygraph examinations
during her testimony. Counsel for the Defendant repeatedly questioned Detective
Gooch concerning what the “investigative techniques and tools” were that she
relied on to rule out other employees such that their bank accounts need not be
examined for the missing money. Counsel for the Defendant also knew that
polygraph examinations had been utilized as an investigative tool in this case.
Counsel for the Defendant also said during the trial, again outside of the presence
of the jury, that he did not know what the detective’s answer[s] to his questions
were going to be.
(R., p. 294 (internal citations omitted).)
On appeal, Klingner argues the district court erred in finding invited error because she
claims that Detective Gooch did not give an “accurate, fair, and responsive answer.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 27-32 (citing Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 864 P.2d 654).) Klingner then
attempts a post-trial impeachment of Detective Gooch’s testimony. (See id.) Klingner’s attempt
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is misplaced. The question is not whether the witness’ entire testimony is credible, the question
is whether the witness’s answer to the particular question was “accurate, fair and responsive.”
See Atkinson, 124 Idaho at 821, 864 P.2d at 659. In Atkinson, the Idaho Court of Appeals found
there was invited error, in part, because the witness under cross-examination gave “an accurate,
fair and responsive answer to defense counsel’s question of ‘When?’” Atkinson, 124 Idaho at
821, 864 P.2d at 659. The same is true here. Klingner repeatedly asked Detective Gooch about
the investigative tool that was used. (2/16/17 Tr., p. 579, L. 13 – p. 580, L. 9.) Detective
Gooch’s answer to that particular question was fair and honest, because the polygraph was an
investigative tool that investigators used to eliminate suspects.
Even if Klingner’s attempt at post-trial impeachment is considered, none of that
attempted impeachment shows any deceit by Detective Gooch. None of Klingner’s citations to
the record refute Detective Gooch’s testimony that she utilized the polygraphs as an investigative
tool to eliminate suspects. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 26-32.) Instead, Klingner cites to portions
of the transcript dealing with how long the investigation lasted (2/16/17 Tr., p. 545, Ls. 1-20),
when the search warrants were served (2/16/17 Tr., p. 71, L. 1 – p. 72, L. 11), and how many
people Detective Gooch personally interviewed (2/16/17 Tr., p. 559, L. 1 – p. 561, L. 22). (See
Appellant’s brief, pp. 28-29.)
Klingner also argues that the state “admitted that the timeline of events did not support
Det. Gooch’s testimony.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 28 (citing 3/22/17 Tr. p. 71, L.1 – p. 72, L. 11.)
This argument does not reflect the state’s argument. During the post-trial hearing, the state
argued that Detective Gooch gave honest answers and Klingner invited the error. (3/22/17 Tr., p.
67, L. 9 – p. 77, L. 11).)
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And after a series of questions, Detective Gooch gave an honest answer,
an honest, accurate answer that reflected -- that was responsive to the defense’s
question. And as such, it was invited error, as the Court ruled on the day of court - or on the day in trial. And as such, it can’t be the basis for a motion for mistrial.
(3/22/17 Tr., p. 70, Ls. 18-25.) The state repeatedly argued that Detective Gooch’s testimony
was truthful and accurate. (See 3/22/17 Tr., p. 67, L. 9 – p. 77, L. 11.)
Regardless, Klingner’s reliance on the timeline is misplaced.

Klingner argues that

because Detective Gooch subpoenaed Klingner’s bank records before any polygraphs, Detective
Gooch’s answer, that the polygraphs were used to determine which bank records to subpoena,
was not truthful. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 27-32.) This is not supported by the record because
Klingner’s question was open ended and did not limit the time period in which the police
determined which bank accounts to subpoena. Klingner asked: “Did you look at anyone else’s
bank account?” (See 2/16/17 Tr., p. 579, L. 13 – p. 580, L. 9.) This was the question that
elicited the first reference to “investigative techniques.” (Id.) However, “Did you look at anyone
else’s bank account?” is an open ended question that is not limited in time. Klingner asked about
the entirety of the investigation. Klingner’s line of questioning focused on her claim that the
investigation did not adequately look at other suspects. Thus, Detective’s Gooch’s eventual
answer, that they did not subpoena anyone else’s bank records during the entirety investigation
because the polygraph eliminated the need to, was perfectly accurate.
Further undermining Klingner’s appellate argument, that Detective Gooch was untruthful,
is the fact that, after the initial motion for mistrial had been heard and denied, Klingner had an
additional opportunity to re-cross Detective Gooch, but declined to do so. (2/21/17 Tr., p. 671,
Ls. 18-21.) If Detective Gooch’s testimony was not accurate, then it was incumbent upon
Klingner to present those inaccuracies on re-cross in front of the jury. Klingner has failed to
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show the district court erred when it denied her motion for a mistrial because she invited the
error. Even if Klingner did not invite the error, the district court still properly denied the motion
for a mistrial.

3.

Even If The Error Was Not Invited, Klingner Did Not Object To Detective
Gooch’s Answer During Cross-Examination And Has Failed To Show She Was
Denied A Fair Trial

On appeal, Klingner argues that the admission of Detective Gooch’s reference to a
polygraph examination on cross-examination was error. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 23-24.) Klingner
argues the district court found that admission of the polygraph evidence was error, so the issue
need not be addressed on appeal. (Appellant’s brief, p. 24 (citing 2/17/17 Tr. p. 620, L. 25 – p.
621, L. 19).) Klingner’s argument is not supported by the record. The transcript citation on
which Klingner relies concerns the district court discussing Klingner’s motion for a mistrial and
finding that Klingner’s continued line of questioning constituted invited error; the court did not
rule that the testimony was inadmissible. (See 2/17/17 Tr., p. 620, L. 25 – p. 621, L. 19.)
Further, in the written post-trial memorandum the district court took issue with Klingner’s
characterization of the admissibility of polygraph testimony. (See R., pp. 292-293.) The district
court went on to hold that the admissibility or inadmissibility of the polygraph evidence could
not support Klingner’s motion. (Id.)
This was not a situation like that prohibited by Perry, where the results of
a polygraph examination were sought to be admitted into evidence to show that
the subject of the examination was telling the truth (or was not telling the truth).
Consequently this assertion cannot support the grant of either of the
Defendant’s motions.
(Id.) Contrary to Klingner’s argument on appeal, the district court did not rule that the admission
of the single reference to a polygraph was error.
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Klingner never moved before the trial to exclude polygraph evidence. Therefore, in order
to establish that the admission of this evidence was in error, Klingner must demonstrate
fundamental error. Absent a timely objection the appellate courts will only review an alleged
error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227-228, 245 P.3d
961, 979-980 (2008). Klingner does not make a fundamental error argument. (See Appellant’s
brief, pp. 23-24.) Nor could she make a successful one, because fundamental error review does
not apply to unobjected-to evidentiary issues. See State v. Beeks, 159 Idaho 223, 230, 358 P.3d
784, 791 (Ct. App. 2015). As a result, Klingner’s first argument, that the district court erred by
admitting the polygraph evidence fails.
Even if the reference to a polygraph was error, that error did not deprive Klingner of a fair
trial. Rather, “[t]he core inquiry” when denial of a mistrial is challenged on appeal is “whether it
appears from the record that the event triggering the mistrial motion contributed to the verdict,
leaving the appellate court with a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same
result had the event not occurred.” Palin, 106 Idaho at 75, 675 P.2d at 54 (Ct. App. 1983).
Where the defendant claims a curative instruction was insufficient to remedy the prejudicial
effect of inadmissible evidence, the appellate court’s analysis focuses not only on the curative
instruction, but also on the “strength of the evidence” and “the significance of the improperly
disclosed information.” See Watkins, 152 Idaho at 768, 274 P.3d at 1283; Ruiz, 159 Idaho at
725, 366 P.3d at 647.
Here, the district court correctly found that, even had the reference to the polygraph not
occurred, it would not have changed the result of the trial. (See R., pp. 294-297.) The district
court did not consider this a “close” case and found there was “[c]ompelling evidence.” (Id.)
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This is a not case where the evidence presented at trial was close,
concerning the issue of the Defendant’s guilt of the charges. Compelling evidence
was presented at trial concerning the shortages between the money that was
recorded as having been received by the county departments (the “transmittals” or
balance records) from county revenue sources (i.e., the court, solid waste, and
indigent services) and the amount of money ultimately submitted for depositing
by the treasurer’s office. As testified to at trial, for instance, by Gina Turner,
Sarita Loya, Cary Allred, and Paul Rekow, there were significant discrepancies
between the receipts (transmittal) records produced by the departments and the
auditor’s certificates produced by the clerk’s office (by the Defendant) and
submitted to the treasurer’s office concerning the sums of money to be deposited
on behalf of the county. The evidence presented at trial identified the Defendant as
the person responsible (by her, for example, access and control) for the reduced
sums being deposited by the county. Evidence was also presented that the
Defendant was undergoing financial duress, during the relevant time period,
contrary to her denials of this to Detective Gooch.
Viewed in the context of this strong evidence of the Defendant’s guilt, the
references at trial to polygraph examinations was not significant. This strong
evidence, along with the curative instruction provided by the court, an instruction
that tracked the language of the instruction utilized in Porter, convinces the court,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that any references to polygraphs in this case was
harmless error, at most.
(R., pp. 296-297 (footnote omitted).) The district court also considered the testimony elicited
from Detective Gooch on redirect and also found a mistrial was not warranted. (R., pp. 297298.)
Again, given the strong weight of the evidence against her presented at
trial, the Defendant is entitled to neither a mistrial nor a new trial, based upon the
State’s redirect examination of Detective Gooch.
(R., p. 298.) Contrary to Klingner’s argument on appeal, the district court properly considered
the compelling evidence, and the curative instruction, and properly denied her motion for a
mistrial.
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II.
The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Allowing Testimony Regarding The Methods
Used To Investigate This Case
A.

Introduction
Prior to re-direct of Detective Gooch, Klingner objected to further testimony regarding

investigative techniques or tools. (2/21/17 Tr., p. 655, L. 15 – p. 657, L. 14.) The district court
overruled the objection. (Id.) Detective Gooch then provided general testimony regarding the
investigation. (2/21/17 Tr., p. 658, L. 20 – p. 671, L. 16.) Detective Gooch did not testify about
Klingner declining to take the polygraph. (See id.) Nor did Detective Gooch testify about the
results of any polygraph examination. (See id.) On appeal, Klingner argues the district court
abused its discretion. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 39-44.) Klingner fails to show the district court
abused its discretion.
Klingner does not articulate which prong of discretionary standard the district court
failed.

Further the district court properly exercised its discretion when it allowed limited

testimony regarding how Detective Gooch investigated the case.

B.

Standard Of Review
When the appellate court reviews the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, the appellate court

applies an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Jones, 160 Idaho 449, 375 P.3d 279 (2016)
(citing Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 163-64, 45 P.3d 816, 819-20
(2002)). To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion, the appellate court considers
whether the trial court “correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether it acted within the
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards, and whether it
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reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Id. (quoting Perry v. Magic Valley Reg’l Med.
Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 51, 995 P.2d 816, 821 (2000)).

C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Overruled Klingner’s Broad
Objection To All Testimony Regarding Investigative Techniques Or Tools
After the district court took the initial motion for a mistrial under advisement and denied

the state’s motion for additional jury instructions, Klingner objected to additional testimony
regarding investigative techniques or tools. (See 2/21/17 Tr., p. 655, L. 15 – p. 657, L. 14.) The
district court overruled the objection and clarified that the state would be permitted, on redirect,
to have Detective Gooch testify regarding the investigative techniques she used in this case. (Id.)
THE COURT: Well, my instructions are that you’re entitled to inquire of
Detective Gooch as to techniques that she used, are they used in this type of an
investigation.
And, Mr. Young, your objection will be noted for the record and will be
deemed a continuing objection to any references to tools or techniques utilized by
law enforcement.
(2/21/17 Tr., p. 657, Ls. 7-14.)
On appeal, Klingner argues the district court abused it direction because it allowed the
state to inquire into polygraph evidence and undermined the curative effect of Instruction 8(A).
(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 39-44.) The district court did not abuse its discretion.
As an initial matter Klingner fails to indicate which of the three prongs of the abuse of
discretion standard of review she believes was implicated by the district court’s action. See
Cummings v. Stephens, 160 Idaho 847, 853, 380 P.3d 168, 174 (2016). Klingner does not
contend that the district court failed to perceive the issue as one of discretion, or that the district
court failed to act within the boundaries of this discretion and consistent with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it or that the district court did not reach its decision
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by an exercise of reason. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 33-44.) As a result this Court should not
consider this abuse of discretion argument on appeal. See Cummings, 160 Idaho at 853, 380
P.3d at 174.
Even if Klingner’s argument is considered on appeal, Klingner fails to show the district
court abused its discretion. It is clear the district court perceived it had the discretion whether to
permit additional testimony regarding investigative techniques. (See 2/21/17 Tr., p. 655, L. 15 –
p. 657, L. 14.)

The district court also acted within the boundaries of its discretion and

consistently with applicable legal standards. (See id.) The district court had earlier ruled that no
additional evidence regarding polygraph testing was to be admitted. (2/17/16 Tr., p. 624, Ls. 1317.) The district court also issued a curative instruction. (See R., p. 188.) However, the district
court also recognized that the state should be allowed to explain some of the investigative
techniques used during the investigation. (See 2/21/17 Tr., p. 655, L. 15 – p. 657, L. 14.)
THE COURT: All right. I think certainly it’s relevant if she utilized the
tools and procedures in this case that were utilized by law enforcement in
embezzlement cases. I think that’s relevant.
(2/21/17 Tr., p. 656, Ls. 13-16.) Klingner argues that polygraph evidence is not admissible.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 43 (citing State v. Perry, 144 Idaho 665, 168 P.3d 49 (Ct. App. 2007)).
However, the district court never ruled that the state was allowed to inquire regarding polygraph
examinations during re-direct. The district court, in fact, ruled the opposite:
And for further direction, further direction, again, polygraph testing is not to be
discussed, not to be presented. Counsel both know that. And I understand and
expect that you will follow that instruction accordingly.
(2/17/16 Tr., p. 624, Ls. 13-17.) The district court acted within the boundaries of its discretion
and consistently with applicable legal standards. Finally, the district court reached its decision by
an exercise of reason. (See 2/21/17 Tr., p. 655, L. 15 – p. 657, L. 14.) The district court
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attempted to balance the interests of the parties and reach a reasonable decision. Even though
Klingner had opened the door regarding the polygraph examinations on cross-examination the
district court still restricted the state from introducing further polygraph evidence. (See 2/17/16
Tr., p. 624, Ls. 13-17.) Klingner has failed to show the district court abused its discretion when
it permitted the state to inquire regarding investigative techniques on re-direct.
Even if the district court abused its discretion, any error was harmless. An error is
harmless if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict would have been the same
had the error not occurred. State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598, 301 P.3d 242, 256 (2013)
(citing State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221, 245 P.3d 961, 973 (2010)). Had the state not been
allowed to introduce evidence regarding investigative techniques on re-direct the verdict would
have been the same. As found by the district court, this was not a “close” case. (See R., pp. 294297.) There was compelling evidence “presented at trial [that] identified the Defendant as the
person responsible (by her, for example, access and control) for the reduced sums being
deposited by the county.” (Id.) Further, there was “strong evidence” of Klingner’s guilt. (Id.)
The verdict would have been the same even had the re-direct not occurred.
Further, Klingner’s argument that somehow the re-direct examination negated the effect
of Instruction No. 8(A) is without support. Instruction 8(A) instructed the jury that polygraph
examinations are not reliable.
Testimony was presented in court regarding the use of polygraph
examinations utilized as an investigative tool by law enforcement to assist them in
the investigation of this case.
Polygraphs are not accepted in the scientific community as a reliable
method of ascertaining the truth and you are not consider whether or not a
polygraph was given or speculate as to what any results might have been.
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(R., p. 188.) Thus, even if the jury interpreted the re-direct examination to be referencing
polygraph examinations, this instruction told them that those investigative methods were not
reliable. (Id.) If anything, this jury instruction attacked the credibility of the state’s case and the
process by which the investigation was undertaken. There is no reason to believe that the jury
disregarded this instruction. Juries are presumed to follow the court’s instructions. State v.
Johnson, 163 Idaho 412, ___, 414 P.3d 234, 244 (2018) (citations omitted). The district court
did not abuse its discretion. Even if it had, that error was harmless.

III.
The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Ordered Restitution
A.

Introduction
Based upon evidence admitted at the restitution hearing and the evidence admitted at trial,

the district court ordered restitution. (See R., pp. 298-300.) On appeal, Klingner fails to show
the district court abused its discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
“‘Whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the district court’s discretion

and is guided by consideration of the factors set forth in Idaho Code section 19-5304(7).’” State
v. Wisdom, 161 Idaho 916, 919, 393 P.3d 576, 579 (2017) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v.
Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 (2011); State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37, 43
P.3d 794, 796 (Ct. App. 2002)).

In determining whether the district court has abused its

discretion, the appellate court considers “whether the district court (1) correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently
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with relevant legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Id. (citing
Swallow v. Emergency Med. Of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 592, 67 P.3d 68, 71 (2003)).
“The issue of causation in restitution cases is a question of fact to be decided by the trial
court.” Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 401 (citing Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 875,
204 P.3d 508, 515 (2009)). “The district court’s factual findings with regard to restitution will
not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (citing State v. Lombard,
149 Idaho 819, 822, 242 P.3d 189, 192 (Ct. App. 2010)); accord State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882,
885, 292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept to support a conclusion.” Straub, 153 Idaho at 885, 292 P.3d at 276 (citing
Kinney v. Tupperware Co., 117 Idaho 765, 769, 792 P.2d 330, 334 (1990)); accord Wisdom, 161
Idaho at 919, 393 P.3d at 579.

C.

Klingner Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion
1.

State v. Nelson Is Distinguishable And The State Presented Evidence At The
Hearing And During Trial To Support Restitution

Klingner argues that the district court abused its discretion because the spreadsheet was
unsworn. (See Appellant’s brief, p. 46 (citing State v. Nelson, 161 Idaho 692, 697, 390 P.3d 418,
423 (2017).) Nelson is distinguishable. First, the Idaho Supreme Court has limited Nelson to
restitution sought by the state for drug prosecutions under Idaho Code § 37-2732(k):
We acknowledge our recent cases of State v. Cunningham, 161 Idaho 698,
390 P.3d 424, 428 (2017), and State v. Nelson, 161 Idaho 692, 390 P.3d 418, 423
(2017), where we held that unsworn representations did not “constitute
‘substantial evidence’ upon which restitution under [Idaho Code] section 372732(k) may be based.” Critical to our holdings in Cunningham and Nelson was
the fact that section 37-2732(k) only permits restitution to be awarded for
prosecution expenses “actually incurred.” We were careful to limit our holdings
in Cunningham and Nelson by hewing close to that statutory mandate, instructing
that “measuring up to section 37-2732(k)’s burden to prove expenses actually
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incurred will generally require sworn statements that delineate the time spent
performing specific tasks.” Cunningham, 390 P.3d at 428; Nelson, 390 P.3d at
423. Thus, Cunningham and Nelson are limited to restitution under section 372732(k), and no analogy can be advanced to this case. Indeed, the causation
inquiry at issue in this case is plainly not susceptible to a sworn accounting ledger.
State v. Wisdom, 161 Idaho 916, 923, 393 P.3d 576, 583 (2017).
Further, regardless whether the spreadsheet was sworn or not sworn, it was admitted into
evidence without objection by Klingner:
THE COURT: So, all right. That will be -- we’ll file that.
And then why don’t we mark this spreadsheet as -- for the purpose of the
restitution hearing. It would be State’s Exhibit 1.
(State’s Exhibit 1 marked)
And have you received a copy of that Mister -[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I have, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. So they’re moving for the admission of that.
What would be the defense’s position?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: It’s admitted.
(State’s Exhibit 1 admitted)
(3/22/17 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 5-20.) Thus, regardless whether any testimony was presented regarding
Exhibit 1, it was admitted into evidence and it was proper for the district court to consider all
evidence admitted at the hearing.
In addition, at the restitution hearing the state submitted the affidavit of Mary Prisco and
had already presented substantial evidence at trial regarding the economic loss of the county.
The district court was permitted to consider evidence presented at the trial and the restitution
hearing when determining restitution. See, e.g., State v. Hill, 154 Idaho 206, 213, 296 P.3d 412,
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419 (Ct. App. 2012). The district court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered restitution
based upon the evidence at trial and admitted at the restitution hearing.

2.

The State Presented Evidence Of Boise County’s Contractual Relationship With
Its Insurance Carrier

Klingner argues that she should not be required to pay restitution to Boise County’s
insurance carrier because the state did not provide evidence that there was a contractual
obligation between Boise County and ICRMP. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 46-47.)
As cited above a district court can consider evidence presented at both the trial and the
restitution hearing when determining restitution. See Hill, 154 Idaho at 213, 296 P.3d at 419.
The state presented evidence at trial that the County’s insurance carrier paid for the loss.
Q. In your capacity as financial officer of the county and after the
determination was made that there was a loss, did you report that loss to ICRIM,
the County’s insurance carrier?
A. I did.
Q. And how much was that?
A. The claim was for $47,922.
Q. And did they accept that claim and pay that claim?
A. They did pay that claim less our $1,000 deductible. So it was $46,922
that came back to the county.
(2/14/17 Tr. p. 81, Ls. 11-22.)

The state presented evidence of a contractual insurance

relationship between Boise County and its insurance carrier.
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3.

The District Court Properly Ordered Klingner To Pay Restitution For The Missing
Checks

Klingner argues that the district court abused its discretion for ordering restitution for
checks and money orders that were missing, but not cashed. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 47-49.)
Klingner argues that because these checks were not cashed, they do not represent a loss to Boise
County or its insurance carrier. (See id.) Klingner’s argument is not supported by the record.
The evidence admitted at trial showed that when a citizen made a payment to a Boise
County department that citizen would get a receipt showing that they paid their obligation to
Boise County. (See, e.g., 2/16/17 Tr., p. 410, L. 16 – p. 411, L. 23, p. 463, L. 15 – p. 466, L. 8.)
Thus, when Klingner stole the checks or money orders, or least did not forward them to the
treasurer’s office, Boise County never received the money that the citizen paid.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 26th day of June, 2018.

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson________________
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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